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site for piercing a corporate veil is the presence of some sort of inequity.
Thus the only guidelines for the lawyer to employ in a piercing case are
his sound reasoning and the facts of the case that might lead to a disregard
of the corporate veil.
The other view is that the supreme court was by implication employing
a two-pronged test 24-showing of identity and, coupled with a showing
that if such identity is allowed to continue, inequity will result. The
court expressly asserted the settled law to be a list of inequities which if
shown dictate piercing. These inequities may be likened to the second
prong of the two-pronged test. The first prong, a showing of identity,
was not mentioned by the Bell court, but the issue of identity may have
been a mental element of its decision.
The two-pronged approach appears to be the better view. The issue of
when to pierce under this test is more narrow and offers more certainty
than does merely balancing the equities in each case; yet the approach is
sufficiently general to be functional. Under the two-pronged test, the
general guide for each case would be clear and each judge and jury could
fit the facts into the guide for a determination of when to pierce. In ad-
dition, under the two-pronged test the law would be more uniform in its
meaning and application to Texas corporations.
David L. Jackson
Determination of "Market Price" Under a Natural Gas Lease:
The Vela Decision
In 1933 lessors executed an oil and gas lease providing for a royalty pay-
ment of "one-eighth of the market price at the wells" on gas sold or
used off the premises. In 193 5 lessees entered into a gas sales contract with
a purchaser. Under this contract the purchaser agreed to pay a price of
2.3 cents per m.c.f.' of gas for the duration of the lease. During the
years subsequent to the execution of the contract, additional production
was commenced in the area by other lessees. These lessees were able to
negotiate gas sales contracts at a price substantially above the 1935 con-
tract price. The royalty owners sought to recover royalty deficiencies,
alleging that the royalty payments should have been based on the current
market price of the gas in the area and not on the 1935 contract price.
Held: The "market price" for gas royalty purposes is to be determined
from an analysis of contract prices currently negotiated in the area, not
by the price received under a long-term sales contract. Texas Oil & Gas
Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968).
'See Pelletier, Corporations, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 134, 142 (1967).
See also notes 11, 12 supra, and accompanying text.
1 An abbreviation for one thousand cubic feet.
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NOTES
I. LEASE ROYALTY CLAUSES AND GAS SALES CONTRACTS
The typical oil and gas royalty clause provides that a share of all oil
produced be delivered in kind to the royalty owners' and that a frac-
tional share of the value or of the proceeds of sale of any gas produced
be paid the owner-lessor of the property. This fractional share common-
ly is expressed in terms of one-eighth of the market price, value, or pro-
ceeds.'
Numerous controversies have arisen with reference to the meaning and
application of the terms "market price" and "market value" in the process
of determining the amount of gas royalty due the lessor." Such disputes
have led one writer to conclude that "the ordinary royalty clause per-
taining to gas is one of the most ambiguous and incomplete provisions of
an oil and gas lease ever to be brought before the courts."' These disputes
usually have been the outgrowth of a long-term gas sales contract. The
business practicalities of the natural gas industry require that gas be sold
under long-term contracts with pipeline companies because the pipe lines
must have a committed source of supply sufficient to justify financing,
construction, and operation.' Since typical gas sales contracts are of sub-
stantial duration, the contract price terms may become onerous when
compared to more favorable currently negotiated contract prices.
II. ROYALTY CLAUSES WHICH MEASURE ROYALTY IN TERMS
OF 'MARKET PRICE" OF GAS SOLD
A precise definition of the term "market price" is difficult.! The mar-
ket price of a normal commodity is what the commodity is actually sold
for in an open market between willing sellers and willing buyers.8 How-
ever, when the nature of the commodity is such that it can be marketed
only through restricted channels (e.g., the gas industry's long-term sales
contract) a court attempting to construe a lease containing the term
"market price" should be realistic in ascertaining the purpose and interest
of the parties.
Texas courts have been reluctant to set forth a rule for determining the
'Sheffield v. Hogg, 124 Tex. 290, 77 S.W.2d 1021 (1934).
33 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW § 650, at 633 (1964). The amount of the
royalty on oil and gas produced is subject to negotiation between the parties to the lease and may
vary with the circumstances in which the lease is executed. See generally id. § 642, at 501.
'Tyson v. Surf Oil Co., 195 La. 248, 196 So. 336 (1940); Katschor v. Eason Oil Co., 178
Okla. 634, 63 P.2d 977 (1937). See also H. WILLIAMS, R. MAXWELL & C. MEYERS, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 295 (1956).
' Sneed, Value of Lessor's Share of Production Where Gas Only Is Produced, 25 TEXAS L. REV.
641, 656 (1947).
'Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964); Philips Petroleum Co. v. Bynum,
155 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1946); Gex v. Texas Co., 337 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
'See Sneed, supra note 5, at 643-52.
8 American Ref. Co. v. Sims Oil Co., 282 S.W. 894, 896 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926), aff'd on
other grounds, 288 S.W. 163 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926).
'Philips Petroleum Co. v. Ochsner, 146 F.2d 138, 141 (5th Cir. 1944); Hemler v. Union
Producing Co., 40 F. Supp. 824, 832-33 (W.D. La. 1941), rev'd on other grounds, 134 F.2d 436
(5th Cir. 1943). Note Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 329 F.2d 485, 488 (5th Cir. 1964), where the
jury determined that no pipeline or other purchaser will buy large quantities of gas on a day-to-
day or other short-term basis. However the court found this conclusion immaterial since it inter-
preted the claims as not being based on short-term fluctuations in price.
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"market price" of gas under a lease,'" but decisions in other jurisdictions
have attempted to establish a workable definition and application of the
term. In Shamrock Oil &q Gas Corp. v. Coffee," where the oil and gas lease
provided for royalties measured by the market price of gas at the well,
"market price" was determined by considering numerous other sales in the
same field during the period involved. In Philips Petroleum Co. v. Bynum"
the Fifth Circuit held that the term "market price at the well" means the
price that gas of the same quality generally brings at the mouth of the
wells in the same field. "Market price" was determined in another case
from all evidence in the same field.1" The Louisiana supreme court has
more clearly defined "market price" not as an arbitrary price fixed by the
lessee, but as the price actually given in contiguous area market dealings."
Several other decisions have stated that the "evidence" of the "market
price" at a specific well is the market price which prevails over the con-
tiguous area."
The problem of when to apply the definition of "market price" also
has created difficulty if there have been substantial gas price increases in
the same area between the time of the signing of the gas sales contract
and the time of litigation." In Foster v. Atlantic Refining Co." the Fifth
Circuit resolved this difficulty by concluding that "market price" was to
be determined at the time of sale, which it determined to be the time of
delivery and not the time when the sales contract was signed.
III. TEXAS OIL AND GAS CORP. V. VELA
In Vela the royalty owners contended that "market price" should be
determined by current prices in the area rather than by the 1935 contract
price.' The lessees countered with the argument that gas is not sold on a
day-to-day basis, that any substantial volume can be marketed only under
a long-term contract that fixes the price to be paid throughout the entire
10 Tcxas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 405 S.W.2d 68, 73 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), aff'd, 429
S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968).
'1 140 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1944).
I 155 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1946).
"aUnion Producing Co. v. Pardue, 117 F.2d 225, 227 (5th Cir. 1941). New York courts have
defined market price as the current price. See Sloan v. Baird, 162 N.Y. 327, 56 N.E. 752, 753
(Ct. App. 1900).
14Wall v. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 178 La. 908, 152 So. 561 (1934).
"5Sartor v. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 84 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1936); Arkansas Natural Gas
Co. v. Sartor, 78 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1935).
'
0 See Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1966), and J. M.
Huber Corp. v. Denman, 367 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1966), two Texas gas royalty valuation cases,
where long periods of time existed between the execution of the contract and the beginning of
litigation. The market value royalty clause in the oil and gas lease was challenged due to the
interstate sale of gas. The principal issue revolved around the fact that, since the FPC has the
authority to fix prices on sale of gas in interstate commerce, it was possible that this would have
the effect of changing the gas royalty clause in the lease between the parties and require that the
royalty payment to the lessor be computed on the basis of the price fixed by the Federal Power
Commission as the price the lessee receives, rather than on the basis of the market price or market
value of the gas in the field where it is produced. The cases were remanded for a determination
of FPC jurisdiction. Note, F.P.C. Primary Examiner's Initial Decision, July 23, 1968, 28 Oil &
Gas Rptr. 667, which affirmed FPC jurisdiction. (The final FPC position is not available as of
this writing.)
'7329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964).
"
8 Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 870 (Tex. 1968).
term, and that the parties were aware of these facts when they made the
lease. Thus, they argued, "market price" of gas within the meaning of the
lease should be the price contracted for in good faith by the lessee in pur-
suance of its duty to market the gas.
The Texas supreme court treated the problem as one of defining "mar-
ket price" and rejected the lessees' argument. A majority of five held that
since none of the royalty owners had agreed to accept royalties according
to the price stipulated in the long-term gas contract, the royalties to
which they were entitled must be determined from the provisions of the
original lease. Under the lease terms the lessee agreed to "pay the lessor,
as royalty for gas from each well ...one eighth of the market price at
the well of the amount so sold or used."' " The majority concluded that
this language established the moment of sale or use to be the moment of
physical delivery.2' On this basis, the supreme court held that the price re-
ceived under a long-term sales contract was not controlling in determining
"market price." Rather, "market price" is to be determined by evaluating
the contiguous and comparable sales in the same field at the time of de-
livery.
In reaching its decision the majority relied on the Fifth Circuit case of
Foster v. Atlantic Refining Co.," which held that a long-term contract
did not modify the lessee's royalty obligation. In Foster the court stated
that "[w]hen it made the gas sales contract, [lessee] took the calculated
risk of that contract producing royalties satisfactory to the lease terms.
The fact that increases in market price have made the lease obligation
financially burdensome is no defense."" In relying on this decision, the
Texas supreme court apparently was convinced that royalties based on
"market price" could not be defined to mean royalties based on "pro-
ceeds." The majority indicated that if the parties had intended that roy-
alties be based on "proceeds," they would have manifested this intention
by agreeing that the royalty on gas produced would be a fractional part of
the amount realized by the lessee from its sale.
The opinion of the four dissenting judges indicates that they felt the
problem was not one of defining "market price" but rather one of decid-
ing when to apply the definition. The dissent stated that "since it appears
that the royalty provision fails to state as of what time the 'market price'
is to be determined, . . . we must look to common practices in the indus-
try at the time the lease contract was made in 1933 to ascertain what
was the intention of the parties with reference to this matter."" Since at
the time the parties signed the lease, long-term gas sales contracts common-
ly were employed, it was urged that the parties must have known that the
"Id. at 870-71.
"Id. at 871. See Martin v. Amis, 288 S.W. 431, 433 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926). This case
established that gas which was marketed under a long-term contract was not "being sold" at the
time the contract was made but at the time of the delivery to the purchaser. But cf. Seabrook
Ind. School Dist. v. Brown, 195 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946), error ref., where the
word "sold" was held not necessarily in all connections to mean that a conveyance must be made
or that title must pass.
2' 329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964). See note 17 supra, and accompanying text.
a' Id. at 489.
"Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 879 (Tex. 1968).
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term "market price" necessarily meant the price prevailing at the time
the long-term contract was signed. The dissent admitted that a "sale"
was not completed until the gas was delivered, but nevertheless contended
that the price clause of the original contract of sale, if fair and reasonable
when made, should control since "it took both the contract of sale and its
delivery to constitute the sale."'
The dissenting judges further observed that the royalty clause in the
Foster lease, unlike the Vela lease, required payment according to the
"market price" in the field when the gas was run. They felt that the
Fifth Circuit would not have reached the same result if the Foster royalty
provision had not contained the words "when run."' In the view of the
dissent, the parties in Foster had contracted effectively against long-term
gas sales contracts, and "clearly and unambiguously"' had obligated the
lessee to pay royalties based on the market price existing on the date the
gas was run. In Vela, the customary "when sold" provision was used,
thereby distinguishing Vela from Foster.
IV. CONCLUSION
Vela apparently indicates that under the terms of a gas lease, current
market prices rather than the contract sale price of gas will now be con-
trolling in determining the "market price." The long-term factor, reach-
ing back to distress price days," may have been an influential factor in
the court's decision. However, in striving toward an equitable result, the
Texas supreme court may be limiting severely the business judgment of
lessees as well as limiting the prompt making of long-term contracts after
the discovery of gas. The lessee was liable under an implied covenant to
market, and both the lessor and the lessee had knowledge of the business
reality that gas almost invariably has to be marketed through long-term
contracts rather than on a spot market basis.
The vulnerability of many leases subject to the Vela decision may be
mitigated by a determination that the royalty owners are subject to FPC
ratemaking, which is not related to market value.2" Even if no FPC juris-
diction is involved, a small variation in clause language might become the
means for reaching an opposite result.2 To avoid vulnerability and am-
biguity in the future it is suggested that if the lessee intends to allow the
24 Id.
25 However it is unclear in Foster whether the "when run" provision was the controlling
reason for the court's decision. It would seem that the "when run" provision was not the con-
trolling reason for the court's decision because the same court in Huber v. Denman, 367 F.2d 104
(5th Cir. 1966), established the same results as that in Foster with a royalty clause containing
no mention of the term "when run." Although the court reached the same conclusion as that
reached in Foster and Vela concerning market price, a different final result was reached due to
possible FPC jurisdiction (see note 16 supra). The Huber gas royalty clause reads as follows: "to
pay the lessors for one-fourth of the gas produced at the mouth of the well . . . four cents per
thousand cubic feet for the first ten years and thereafter the market price of such gas."
"
6 Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 880 (Tex. 1968).
"72 9 Oil & Gas Rptr. 150 (1968).
:s See notes 16 and 25 supra.
9 See Skelly Oil Co. v. Harris, 352 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1962); ci. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Reid,
161 Tex. $1, 337 S.W.2d 267 (1960).
[Vol. 23
